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The aim of this paper is to test three theories for why firms introduce job rotation schemes: 
employee learning, employer learning, and employee motivation. The earlier literature has made 
use of either information about establishment characteristics or data coming from personnel 
records of a single firm. In order to improve upon this, we make use of a unique data set 
constructed by merging information from a fairly detailed survey directed at Danish private 
sector firms with a linked employer-employee panel data. This allows us to include firm and 
workforce characteristics as well as firms HRM practices as explanatory variables, and hence to 
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                Why do some firms introduce job rotation while others choose not to? A growing 
amount of research is using representative surveys of establishments to answer this question 
(Osterman 1994, 2000; Gittleman, Horrigan and Joyce 1998; OECD 1999). Because their unit of 
analysis is the establishment, these papers usually provide little evidence about the effect of 
employee characteristics on the probability of adoption. They focus on establishment 
characteristics instead. Analyses of job rotation based on individual data are more unusual 
because they often require access to personnel records, which firms are rarely willing to grant. 
Moreover, such papers are typically able to study merely one firm at a time (Campion, Cheraskin 
and Stevens 1994; Kusunoki and Numagami 1998), which raises the issue of whether the results 
that they find are representative. We think that a satisfactory test of the theories should combine 
a representative sample of establishments with data on employee characteristics. To build such a 
database, we have merged a representative survey of Danish firms with register data on each of 
these firms' employees. The resulting database is richer than most surveys of establishments and 
provides more representative evidence than individual case studies. 
We concentrate on three theories of job rotation. The first theory claims that employees 
who rotate accumulate more human capital because they are exposed to a wider range of 
experiences. The more an employee moves, the more he learns. We refer to this as the employee 
learning theory.  The second theory is that the firm itself learns more about its own employees if 
it can observe how they perform at different jobs. To find the job that an employee is best at, the 
employer needs to move the employee around and observe how he performs at each position. We 
call this the employer learning theory. The last theory is that job rotation motivates employees 
who would otherwise become bored and tired of always performing the same tasks. The theories 
deliver different predictions regarding the types of employees who are more likely to rotate and 
the types of firms where rotation is more likely.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section I we describe the three 
theories in more detail and discuss briefly existing evidence regarding the determinants of the 
adoption job rotation. The second section starts with a description of the data sources used and a 
discussion of how the variables used in testing are operationalized. The second half of section II 
gives the results of the econometric analysis and our interpretation of them. Some concluding 
remarks are offered in section III. 
  2I.  Theories and Empirical Implications 
 
As Campion, Cheraskin and Stevens (1994) point out, the management literature often 
refers to job rotation as a useful practice, but very few authors have conducted a detailed analysis 
of its costs and benefits. Nonetheless, three types of arguments are recurrent in job rotation 
discussions: for some people, rotation is a training device; for others, it is mostly a way to 
discover which jobs different employees are best at; and for a third group of people, job 
rotation’s main benefit is motivation.  
 
I. A.  Employee Learning 
The employee learning argument is that job rotation is an effective way to develop 
employees’ abilities. According to Champion, Cheraskin and Stevens (1994), job rotation 
produces two beneficial effects. First, an employee who rotates accumulates experience more 
quickly than an employee who does not rotate. Hence job rotation is mentioned as an effective 
tool for career development. Second, an employee who rotates accumulates experience in more 
areas than an employee who does not rotate. Hence, if an employee rotates more frequently, it is 
easier to train him to become a generalist. For example, according to Ouchi (1981), the extensive 
use of rotation by Japanese companies would explain why Japanese employees are more often 
generalists than specialists, in particular when compared to U.S. employees. Lazear’s (2002) 
“jack of all trades” theory for entrepreneurship and managerial jobs builds on the same notion. 
According to the employee learning argument, we should expect job rotation to be more 
likely when employees have more need to be trained. First, employees with less tenure in the 
firm should rotate more frequently than employees with more tenure. Second, for a given level of 
tenure in the firm, employees who had previous work experience in the same industry are 
probably better trained, and should therefore rotate less frequently. Last, plants where the levels 
of on-the-job training are high must be plants where employees have a high need to be trained. 
Hence, these plants should have higher probabilities of adoption. 
 
I. B. Employer Learning 
The employer learning argument is that job rotation provides information that the firm 
can use to improve the allocation of jobs among employees. If an employee can be observed 
performing different activities, it may be easier for the firm to find out the most appropriate job 
  3for that employee (Ortega 2001). With a job rotation policy, each time an employee rotates, the 
employer learns about new dimensions of the employee's ability. On the contrary, if an employee 
does not rotate, the dimensions of the employee’s ability that the firm learns about are always the 
same, and the returns to learning soon become small.  
Ortega (2001) shows that the relative benefits of job rotation increase when the firm 
knows little about its employees’ abilities. The relative benefits are also larger when the firm is 
engaging in new activities for which the returns are a priori unknown. This has sharp empirical 
consequences. First, employees with less tenure in the firm are more likely to rotate, because the 
firm will be more interested in learning about them. This implies that job rotation should be 
adopted with a higher probability in firms where average employee tenure is lower. Second, any 
previous work experience that current employees may have accumulated in other, similar firms 
should have no effect on the probability of rotation: only the average tenure in the current firm 
should matter. This is different from what the employee learning theory predicts. Last, if the firm 
is relatively young or is introducing innovations, we should expect it to use more job rotation. 
 
I. C. Employee Motivation 
The employee motivation argument is that job rotation contributes to make work more 
interesting. This argument was mentioned in the late 1970s literature on the so-called 
“plateaued” employees -employees with limited prospects of promotion. According to Ference, 
Stoner and Warren (1977), job rotation is a potential solution to these employees’ lack of 
motivation.  More recently, Cosgel and Miceli (1999) have pointed out increased satisfaction as 
one of the benefits of rotation. In their model, employees prefer to perform a variety of tasks 
rather than specializing in a single task and, as a consequence, job rotation increases job 
satisfaction. This is beneficial to the firm because it can afford to pay lower salaries when 
employees are more satisfied. However, job rotation does not contribute to training: contrary to 
the employee learning argument, employees learn more by specializing than by rotating.   
If job rotation is a motivation tool, we would expect it to be used by firms where 
employees have poorer prospects of promotion. This stands in sharp contrast with the employee 
learning story: if employees rotate and become better trained, but there are no prospects of 
promotion, such employees will leave the firm and will try to find a better job elsewhere. This 
means that the firm will have little incentive to use job rotation in the first place. On the contrary, 
  4when promotion opportunities abound, job rotation becomes a more valuable human resource 
policy.  
 
I. D. Existing Evidence 
In the last decade, several authors have provided evidence on the adoption of job rotation 
practices: see Table 1 for a review of the surveys, their methodology and findings. Considerably 
fewer studies have been able to test the theories. In fact, as can be seen from the summary in 
Table 2, previous papers analysing the decision to introduce job rotation do not speak to the 
question why rotation is useful. Earlier work has rather focused on the degree of product market 
competition, firm strategy (quality versus cost reduction), cultural values in the firm, 
complementary human resources management (HRM) practices, and the use of advanced 
technology. Although interesting in their own right, these studies do not inform us about the 
types of benefits job rotation provides. This is due to the fact that it is difficult to test the theories 
in this respect without data on employee characteristics. Two exceptions are the case studies of 
Campion, Cheraskin and Stevens (1994) and Kusunoki and Numagami (1998).  
Campion, Cheraskin and Stevens (1994) study job rotation inside the finance department 
of a large U.S. pharmaceutical company. First, they find that tenure has a negative effect on the 
rate of job rotation: junior employees rotate more frequently than senior employees. Second, the 
educational level has no significant effect on the rate of job rotation. Third, individual 
performance has a significant positive effect on the rate of rotation. Fourth, the rate of rotation 
has a moderate positive effect on the rate of promotion. Last, the authors use a questionnaire to 
complete the data that they have collected from personnel records. In that questionnaire 
employees are asked their opinion about the benefits of job rotation. According to the 
employees, job rotation provides increased knowledge. 
Kusunoki and Numagami (1998) study the patterns of interfunctional mobility of 
engineers in a large Japanese company. First, they find that employees with fewer years of tenure 
do not rotate more than more senior employees. In fact, rotation frequencies seem to vary very 
little during the first fourteen years of an employee's career, contrary to Campion, Cheraskin and 
Stevens (1994). Second, the educational level has no significant effect on rotation. Third, there is 
a positive relationship between the employee's speed of promotion and the rate of rotation. Last, 
they find that the directions and patterns of rotation are complex and vary significantly according 
to promotion speeds.     
  5An unresolved issue is whether these findings are representative of other firms in the 
economy. The two studies differ as far as the effect of tenure on job rotation is concerned. It may 
be that the pharmaceutical company studied by Campion, Cheraskin and Stevens (1994) is 
special in the way it structures its job rotation programs, or it may be that the Japanese firm is. 
The only way to shed some light on this issue is to use multi-firm data. Also, both studies 
consider relatively large companies. Can their results be generalized to smaller companies? This 
again calls for the use of a more representative database. At the same time, however, the tests of 
the theories require data on individual employee characteristics, which are usually unavailable in 
multi-firm surveys. Our database is designed to address these issues. 
 
 
II.  Testing the Theories 
 
II. A. Data Description 
 
The data used in this paper have been constructed by merging information from two 
different sources. The first is a survey directed to firms and the second is an employer-employee 
linked panel. The survey (see Eriksson 2000 for details) represents a unique source of 
information on Danish firms’ internal labor markets and changes therein. In addition to some 
background information about the firm, the firms were asked about their work organization, 
compensation systems, recruitment, internal training practices and how they evaluate their 
employees, as well as about recent changes in these. This paper makes use of the firms’ answers 
to questions regarding their use of job rotation schemes.
1  The survey was administered by 
Statistics Denmark as a mail questionnaire that was sent out in May and June 1999 to 3,150 
private sector firms with more than 20 employees. The firms were chosen from a random 
sample, stratified according to size (as measured by the number of full time employees) and 
industry. The survey over-sampled large and medium-sized firms: all firms with 50 employees or 
more were included, and 35 per cent of firms in the 20-49 employee range.  
The response rate was 51 per cent, which is relatively high for a long and detailed 
questionnaire, and provides 1,605 useful observations. The response rates for the size and 
industry cells vary only little: between 47 and 53 per cent. Concerning organization of work 
within the company, the firm was asked whether it had adopted the following work practices: 
  6self-managed teams, job rotation, quality circles, total quality management, benchmarking, and 
project organization. In answering this question, the firm was furthermore asked to distinguish 
between adoption of the work practices for hourly paid workers and for salaried employees 
(including managers). 
The other data source, the employer-employee linked panel, has been constructed by 
Statistics Denmark by merging a number of registers utilizing the unique identification numbers 
of individuals and plants (firms). The panel contains detailed information about all employees 
and their wage earnings in all Danish firms during the period 1980-98 as well as economic 
information about the firms since 1992. This data source enables us to create measures 
describing the composition and other characteristics of firms’ workforces. 
According to the survey, one out of five firms has implemented job rotation schemes for 
hourly paid workers. Considerably fewer firms – about 6 per cent – have adopted them for their 
salaried employees.
2  As can be seen from Table 3, about 20 per cent of the firms had already job 
rotation schemes (for either hourly paid or salaried workers, or both) before 1990 (most of which 
had introduced them in the eighties), 40 per cent implemented them during the first half of the 
nineties and equally many during the second half. The pace of adoption does not differ much 
between domestic and foreign owned firms.  
The share of firms that adopted job rotation schemes varies across industries and by firm 
size; see Table 4. Firms in the services and manufacturing sectors are much more likely than 
firms in other industries to have implemented them for their hourly paid employees. Firms in the 
business and finance sector are more likely to have introduced them for the salaried employees. 
For both categories of workers, the share of adopters clearly increases with firm size. 
Table 5 gives some summary statistics for the firms that responded to the survey 
questionnaire as well as some information concerning their workforces. By construction, the 
sample firms are, on average, larger than Danish companies in general. Likewise, as the firms are 
from the private sector, the proportion of female employees is considerably lower than of total 
employment. Moreover, the workforce turnover rate of firms (which will be explained more 
below) is relatively high; during a year on average 30 and 24.5 per cent of hourly paid and 
salaried employees, respectively leave their firms. Seventy per cent of the firms have a local 
wage agreement for their hourly paid workers, implying a relatively strong presence of unions. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1  In addition, several of the explanatory variables in our empirical analysis are constructed from the firms’ answers 
to the survey questionnaire. 
  7As for other new work practices, we may note that about one fourth of the firms have self-
managed teams, whereas TQM and quality circles are clearly less common. 
From the table it can be seen that firms that have adopted job rotation for their workers 
on hourly pay differ in various ways from those that have not. The adopting firms are slightly 
younger, considerably larger and faster-growing, and are more likely to be in the manufacturing 
sector
3 and to have a local wage agreement with the trade unions. These firms are also more 
prone to recruit new personnel from within the company and/or the local labor market.   
Furthermore, the adopters are much more likely to have implemented new work practices. 
Adopters have more frequently introduced performance related pay systems than non-adopters. 
As for the workforce characteristics, the main difference regards the share of female employees 
in the firms' workforces. 
In the main the firms that rotate their salaried employees share many of the 
characteristics with those that rotate workers on hourly compensation. The only notable 
differences concern relative training costs, which are higher for adopting firms, and recruitment 
from sources outside the internal or local labor markets, which is more common among adopters. 
Finally, we may note that firms with a pronouncedly flat hierarchy are less likely to have job 
rotation schemes.    
 
 
II. B. The Empirical Model 
We have carried out a set of logit model estimations for whether the firms have adopted 
job rotation or not.  We use two separate dependent variables, one for job rotation adoption for 
hourly paid workers, and another for the salaried employees. As explanatory variables we use 
three groups of regressors: (i) firm characteristics, (ii) workforce characteristics, and (iii) other 
HRM practices and some controls. We next describe them briefly. 
 
Firm Characteristics. Beginning with the firm characteristics, one is firm size as 
measured by the number of employees in the company. Size may matter for two reasons. One is 
that there are technical constraints to the implementation of job rotation: in order to operate a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2 Compared to other new work practices, job rotation is quite common for the hourly paid workers; only teams are 
more frequently implemented. In contrast, for the salaried workers job rotation is among the least used. 
3 Gittleman et al. (1998) also find more of the new work practices in the manufacturing sector and in larger firms. 
U.S. wholesale and trade firms have adopted new work practices to a considerably higher extent than those in 
Denmark. 
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cohorts), it is necessary that there are a certain minimum number of jobs. This implies that the 
job rotation probability increases in firm size. The other reason why size may affect the adoption 
of job rotation, and moreover in the opposite direction, is that multi-tasking and flexibility is less 
valuable in larger establishments or firms; see Lazear (1998; 445-46, 473-74). 
Another firm characteristic we consider is the hierarchical structure of the firm. Our 
measure for this pertains only to the salaried employees and is the number of job levels in the 
firm within this category.
4 According to the motivation hypothesis, the fewer the number of 
levels in the hierarchy, and hence the less promotion opportunities there are, the higher is the 
likelihood of the firm implementing a job rotation scheme. The less levels in the hierarchy, the 
more plateaued workers are there. In contrast, the employee and employer learning hypotheses 
both suggest that a positive hierarchy-job rotation relationship could arise as a result of 
employers using job rotation as a prerequisite for promotions into higher rung jobs with multiple 
tasks (Ouchi 1981). 
The  age of the firm, and particularly the extent to which this coincides with the 
introduction of job rotation, is a potentially important variable. Younger firms that have had job 
rotation as part of their HRM schemes as from the beginning are likely to have a relatively new 
technology, and consequently, use job rotation as a means of learning about their employees. 
Hence, finding a higher probability of job rotation in younger firms is compatible with the 
employer learning story. In addition to size and age of the firm, we have also included the (5-
year average) growth rate of the (employment of the) firm. This is expected to be positively 
related to job rotation as expanding firms are in a similar situation as young firms when it comes 
to learning about new employees in new jobs. 
Other features of the companies entered as explanatory variables are the presence of 
unions in the firm, the relative wage of the firm and the firm’s expenditure on on-the-job 
training of its employees. The presence of unions is proxied by a positive answer to the question 
whether the firm has signed a local wage agreement with its workers, as this is typically the case 
when there are particularly active and strong unions in the workplace. Unions occasionally resist 
more flexible work practices because they are said to increase the pace and stressfulness of work 
without accompanying higher compensation. On the other hand, unions and collective bargaining 
                                                           
4  This information is derived from the survey in which the firms were asked about the number of job levels for non-
production workers. 
  9have also been found to facilitate changes involving increased employee involvement. Thus, the 
impact of the presence of unions is unclear a priori. 
 We include two alternative measures of the firm’s relative wage; the first is relative to 
local competitors, and the second is relative to industry average.
5 Of course, as the analysis is 
cross-sectional, we cannot claim unidirectional causality.
6 (That is the topic of a fuller and 
separate analysis.)  
The questionnaire asked the firms how much money they spend on training their 
employees. From the responses to this question we have constructed a variable showing the 
firm’s per capita training costs relative to the average for all firms. In the survey the firms were 
also asked about the number of hours spent on on-the-job training during ordinary working time. 
From this a corresponding relative training costs measure (in terms of hours) can be constructed. 
The advantage of the latter is that it is specifically about training on-the-job, whereas the 
advantage of the former is that it is in money terms. They are strongly correlated and both yield 
similar estimation results. Hence in what is presented below, we use the relative per capita 
training costs variable. A positive relation between training costs and job rotation would indicate 
that rotation is used as a part of employee training programs, which is in accordance with the 
employee learning hypothesis.  
Other firm characteristics included as controls are the already mentioned average rate of 
employment growth during 1990-95, and industry dummies. The latter are likely to pick up the 
influence of competitiveness of market conditions, technology and a variety of other factors. 
 
Workforce Characteristics. Turning next to the workforce characteristics, it should first 
be noticed that the information emanates from the linked panel data set. Both employer and 
employee learning explanations would lead us to expect a negative relation between the average 
tenure of the firm’s workforce and the probability of having job rotation schemes.  Short average 
tenure may reflect the age of the firm. However, as we control for that, a low average tenure is 
more likely to be a consequence of a high workforce turnover. The distribution of tenure in firm 
is typically rather skewed, and so the mean is not necessarily a good measure to characterize it. 
                                                           
5  Both are dummies created from questions in the survey asking firms on this. An alternative source to this 
information is the employer-employee linked data set. From other work on the data, we know that the answers to 
these questions in the survey are quite accurate.   
6  A study by Eriksson (2003), which uses the same data source as in this paper, finds that some new work practices, 
including job rotation schemes, are associated with higher firm average wages also after controlling for differences 
in skill structures of firms’ workforces. 
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variables: (i) ½(hires in year t + hires in year t-1)/number of employees in year t, and (ii) ½(hires 
in year t + separations in year t)/number of employees in year t. The measure we use in 
estimations is an average taken over the annual observations for the period 1985-95. However, 
neither of these measures yielded any different results than the average tenure, and are therefore 
reported below. 
A third measure used is the share of employees that have been employed less than two 
years. The motivation for including this variable is that learning does not occur at a constant rate 
but is mainly concentrated to the first years of an employment relationship after which it declines 
considerably. All three measures mentioned above refer to tenure in the firm. An additional 
measure employed is the average tenure in industry. This is potentially a key variable, since it 
allows us to discriminate between the employer and employee learning theories. In the latter, 
both previous and current tenure matter, whereas in the former previous experience should not 
affect the firm’s use of job rotation.  
The gender composition of the firm’s workforce is included as the proportion of female 
employees in respective workforce category. In order to control for differences in skill 
composition we use the proportion of employees in the relevant category with more than 
compulsory education, i.e., 10 years of schooling. 
Beside average characteristics of the firms’ workforces, we have computed their standard 
deviations as measures of the heterogeneity of each firm’s employees. The idea is that a firm, the 
workforce of which differs substantially with respect to age, tenure and education, is more likely 
to benefit more from obtaining information about its employees by rotating them than a firm 
with a more homogeneous workforce; cf. Lazear (1999), pp. 473-74. Consequently, the employer 
as well as the employee learning hypotheses imply that the likelihood of job rotation increases 
with worker heterogeneity.  
 
Other HRM Practices. The HRM practices that are included in our analysis refer to the 
firm’s recruitment strategy and to other new work practices implemented by the firm. In order to 
distinguish between the alternative explanations for why firms use job rotation, information 
about the source of new employees in the firm may be useful. In the survey, the firms were asked 
about wherefrom they recruited different groups of personnel. Four different sources of 
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same industry, and (iv) whole Denmark. 
Information about how the firm recruits new personnel can help in distinguishing 
between competing explanations. In general, one would expect that job rotation is more common 
in firms that hire their workers from outside. The longer the “distance” between the firm and the 
recruitment source, the lower is the precision of the knowledge the firm has about its new 
employees. When the employees are predominantly hired from within, employers need to learn 
less about them.  Consequently, the employer learning hypothesis predicts that job rotation is 
more common in firms recruiting outside the firm or the local labour market.   
Of the other work practices used by the firms, we have entered self-managed teams, 
TQM and quality circles as additional control variables into the logit models. The motivation for 
including them is to examine whether these new work practices are complementary as has been 
argued by e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1995). As total quality management and quality circles aim 
at controlling quality at different stages of the production process, it seems natural that 
employees in firms using these practices need experience of different tasks and in 
communication with other employees have some familiarity with other jobs and tasks. In 
addition we have included dummy variables for whether the firm implements the following 
performance related pay systems: team bonuses, individual bonuses and stock/stock options. The 
purpose is to examine whether the performance pay schemes provide incentives for employees to 
engage in job rotations. A summary of the predictions of the different theories regarding the key 
explanatory variables is given in Table 6.  
 
II. C. Econometric Analysis 
Separate regressions were estimated for hourly paid and salaried workers, with and 
without distinguishing by firm size (firms with fewer or more than 100 employees). Estimation 
results are found in Table 7. The distinction between hourly paid and salaried employees is 
needed because jobs differ substantially from one category of employees to another. The 
distinction between small and large firms is also important. In companies where there are few 
employees and few positions, the extent to which employees can rotate may be quite limited, and 
it may simply be unfeasible for such companies to implement stable job rotation policies. In 
addition to that, smaller companies know their employees much better, which makes the 
employer learning motive for rotation irrelevant. In any case, the estimation approach does not 
constrain the results to be different for each of the four groups: it just allows for that possibility.  
  12In the two first columns of the table, we report the estimates for all firms where we have 
included firm size as an explanatory variable. We can see that the probability of having job 
rotation schemes increases with the number of employees in the firm. The next four columns 
distinguish between small and larger firms. We find, with a few exceptions, a similar pattern as 
for all firms, but the estimates are more precisely determined for the larger firms. 
The number of job levels has a significant effect on the rotation of salaried employees of 
large firms.
7 Firms with 3-5 levels are significantly more likely to use job rotation for their 
salaried employees than firms with fewer levels.
8 Moreover, the effect goes in the direction 
predicted by the employee and employer learning theories: when the number of job levels 
increases, the adoption of job rotation schemes is more likely. This is because both theories view 
job rotation as a pre-requisite to be promoted to higher level jobs. The greater the possibilities of 
promotion, the greater the value of job rotation. On the contrary, the result is contrary to the 
employee motivation theory, according to which, if there are greater promotion opportunities, 
there should be less need for job rotation. 
The age of the firm variable attaches a positive coefficient, but as this does not differ 
from zero, it yields little support for the employer learning hypothesis.
9 However, this lack of 
significance could be due to the fact that we can only distinguish between three periods for firm 
age (1990s, 1980s and prior to 1980). As an alternative, we can look at the firms’ rates of 
employment growth: according to the employer learning hypothesis, we would expect high 
growth firms to be in a similar situation as young firms, insofar as they also need to learn about 
their new employees. Thus, if employees rotate for an employer learning motive, high growth 
firms should be more likely to implement job rotation schemes. Indeed, the data show that the 5-
year average firm growth has a significant effect on job rotation, which is consistent with the 
employer learning theory.   
Other aspects of the firms that are associated with a higher likelihood of job rotation are 
the presence of unions (for hourly paid workers) and higher than average per capita training 
costs.  The finding that firms spending more on training their employees are more likely to have 
job rotation schemes is favourable to the employee learning hypothesis.  
                                                           
7 As noted before, the number of job levels refers only to the category of salaried employees. Hence the regressions 
for the hourly paid employees do not include this variable. 
8 The coefficient corresponding to 6+ levels is not significant, but very few firms have so many levels, which makes 
it very difficult to obtain precise estimates. 
9 Note, however, that only 13.6 per cent of the firms have introduced rotation schemes as from the year the firm was 
established, and 15 per cent during the first ten years of the firm’s existence.  
  13Average tenure in the firm obtains significant and negatively signed coefficient estimates 
for the hourly paid in large firms, which is consistent with both the employer and employee 
learning hypotheses: firms where average tenure is smaller have a greater need to train their 
employees (the employee learning argument) or to learn more about them (the employer learning 
argument).
10 Whereas tenure in the firm has a significant effect on rotation, tenure in the industry 
has no significant effect. This is consistent with the employer learning theory, and contradicts the 
employee learning theory.  
The employer learning hypothesis receives some support from the results concerning the 
sources of new personnel recruitment. The hypothesis predicts that firms that chiefly recruit at 
the national level have a greater need to learn about their new employees than firms that recruit 
from their own ranks or from the local labour market. Hence, firms with broader recruitment 
strategies are more likely to use job rotation. Indeed, the regressions show that, for the larger 
firms, recruiting salaried employees at the national scale has a positive effect on the use of job 
rotation. The effect of recruiting internally or locally, however, is not significant: this contradicts 
the employer learning theory (which predicts a negative sign) and maybe the employee learning 
theory (which would predict a positive sign if internal recruitment implies better promotion 
opportunities for current employees).  
As for other workforce characteristics, we find that the proportion of females in the 
firm’s workforce is positively and strongly correlated with the probability that the firm rotates its 
workers. We are not able to offer any obvious explanations for this. A potential explanation 
(consistent with employee and employer learning) is that firms with a large percentage of 
females have greater rates of turnover. However, we have checked whether the proportion of 
females is particularly high in some industries or correlated with high workforce turnover, and it 
turned out not to be. Another possibility is that females and males have different jobs and that 
the gender dummy is just capturing this “sorting” effect. The estimates to the share of workers 
with more than compulsory education also have relatively large marginal effects, although the 
coefficients, which differ in sign between the hourly paid and the salaried employees, carry 
rather large standard errors.  Heterogeneity (with respect to experience, as measured by age) is 
contrary to the employer and employee learning hypotheses negatively related to job rotation. 
                                                           
10 However, the share of employees with less than 2 years of tenure with the firm did never obtain a coefficient 
differing significantly from zero and is therefore omitted from the logit models in table 7.   
 
  14This is puzzling as one would expect that rotating employees possessing different pieces of 
knowledge would be useful. 
The estimations do indeed provide evidence of the notion of complementarity between 
different work practices: teams, quality circles and TQM are all positively related to the adoption 
of job rotation schemes. The fact that rotation is more likely in firms where teams are being used, 
indicates that the firms are not using the information it learns to re-allocate tasks since their 
employees work in teams anyway. This would speak against the employer learning hypothesis. 
However, the firm might use rotation to learn the best way to assign tasks within teams. 
The complementarity between job rotation and the other work practices seems to be so 
strong that it is possible that the inclusion of the latter is capturing the effects of other variables 
“explaining” the adoption of job rotation. We have therefore also estimated the logit model 
without the dummies for TQM, quality circles and teams. The results, which are not reported, 
turned out to be quite close to obtained before; only the explanatory power of the estimated logit 
model is significantly reduced. The adoption of job rotation does not seem to be associated with 
firms having implemented performance related pay schemes. 
Table 8 reports some of our efforts to check the robustness of the estimation results. To 
save space we report only the results for all firms. The estimates for small and larger firms, 
respectively (are available from the authors upon request and) differ only marginally from those 
in Table 7 above. The first two columns give estimates based on smaller samples obtained by 
excluding those firms that have implemented rotation schemes prior to 1990. The motivation for 
imposing this restriction on the data is that most of the explanatory variables refer to the second 
half of the nineties. With the exception for one explanatory variable the exclusion of about one 
fifth of the firms leads to fair small changes in the coefficient estimates and their standard errors. 
The same applies to the two other restrictions that were enforced in the estimations shown in 
columns (3) to (6). Here we have excluded the most heterogenous firms in order to have the 
empirical analysis to conform more to the representative firm assumption. This was implemented 
by first computing for each firm the standard deviation of education years and age of their 
workforces, and next excluding the 15 per cent of firms in both tails of the standard deviations 
distributions. As can be seen from the table, the estimates from these more homogenous firm 
samples resemble those obtained from the full sample closely and their precision is affected only 
little. 
  15The only change worth noting is that according to Table 8 the salaried employees are 
paid more in firms that have adopted job rotation schemes. However, causality can go both ways 
as firms that are performing well and hence can afford to pay higher salaries, may also have 




III.  Conclusions 
 
 
We have used data created by linking a questionnaire concerning firms’ HRM and pay 
practices to a longitudinal matched employer-employee data set to examine the determinants of 
the adoption of job rotation schemes in Danish firms. Hourly paid workers and salaried 
employees in small and larger firms, respectively, are studied separately. Our aim is not only to 
shed further light on who adopts job rotation schemes, but in particular to study why the firms 
are implementing them. We distinguish between three different explanations, which we label 
employee learning, employer learning and employee motivation, respectively. 
We find strong complementarity between job rotation and other human resource 
management practices. Rotating employees is not, however, complementing performance pay 
systems adopted by the employers. Moreover, we find that the likelihood of job rotation 
increases with firm size, stronger presence of unions, the proportion of females in the firm’s 
workforce and the homogeneity with respect to experience of the workforce. The two first 
findings are largely expected. A certain size of the workplace is likely to be needed to operate 
rotation schemes. It is also possible that in smaller firms, employees carry out multiple tasks and 
there is therefore less need for a formalized rotation scheme. Other studies have also found the 
presence of unions to facilitate introduction of flexibility-enhancing HRM schemes. The two 
latter observations regarding the gender composition and the heterogeneity of the firms’ 
workforces are, however, rather puzzling. The gender variable might be capturing a sorting 
effect (males and females have different types of jobs). 
As for the three theories for why firms choose to rotate the workers, we find first of all 
very limited support for the employee motivation hypothesis. Job rotation schemes are not more 
                                                           
11 The evidence from the small but growing literature on the benefits of new work practices is something of a mixed 
bag. Black and Lynch (1999) find positive wage effects, whereas Cappelli and Neumark (2001) find only small 
wage effects, and Osterman (2000) no effects at all. For a recent, comprehensive review, see Ichniowski and Shaw 
(2003). 
  16likely in firms with long-tenured employees, nor in firms with a relatively flat hierarchy and 
hence little promotion prospects.  
The statistical evidence is more favourable to the employee and the employer learning 
hypotheses.  Regarding the employee learning argument we find that firms that spend relatively 
much on training their employees are more likely to rotate workers. Moreover, job rotation 
schemes are more common in less hierarchical firms and in firms with shorter average firm 
tenure in their workforces. These two observations also lend support to the employer learning 
story. Two findings speak against employee learning. One is the negative relationship between 
job rotation and worker heterogeneity. Employee learning predicts the opposite because rotation 
–and the information transfer associated with it-- is more useful when employees have differing 
pieces of knowledge. Another is that average industry tenure turns out insignificant (as predicted 
by the employer learning hypothesis), whereas according to employee learning theory is should 
be negative. 
Other results supporting the employer learning explanation are the positive association 
between job rotation schemes and firm growth rates and firms using national recruitment 
sources. On the other hand, firms recruiting from within or from the local labour market are not 
(as predicted by the employer learning hypothesis) less likely to implement job rotation schemes. 
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  21Table 3 
Time of Adoption of Job Rotation by Type of Ownership
 
Group of firms  Before 1991  1991-95  After 1995  Total 
Type of ownership: 
Domestic 23.5  39.3  37.2  100.0 
Foreign 19.3  42.1  38.6  100.0 





Percentage of Firms Using Job Rotation by Industry and Size 
 
Group of firms  Hourly paid  Salaried 
By industry: 
Manufacturing 28.1  4.4 
Construction 4.5  2.2 
Wholesale and retail trade  5.7  8.6 
Transportation and communication  7.1  6.0 
Business and finance  3.1  13.1 
Services 50.0  0.0 
By firm size (No. of employees): 
-50 10.2  3.1 
51-100 21.1  4.2 
101-350 23.1  6.6 
351-500 33.3  15.4 
501- 37.0  18.5 





















  22Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Hourly paid  Hourly paid  Salaried  Salaried 





Size (number of employees) 
Annual employment growth (%) 
 
Number of job levels (%): 
3-5 
6 or more 
Training costs relative to industry 
Local wage agreement (%) 
 
Average turnover rate 
Av. tenure in firm (years) 
Av. tenure in industry (years) 
Prop. with more than comp. educ. 
Prop. female employees 
 
 
Recruits from (%): 
Within 
Local labor market 
All of Denmark 
Same industry 
 










Industry (share in %): 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
Wholesale and trade 
Transportation and communication 





















































































































































































            
  23 
Table 6 
Determinants of Adoption Predicted by the Three Alternative Theories 
 
Predicted Effects   







Number of job levels  +  +  - 
Firm age  0  -  0 
The firm’s growth rate  0  +  0 
Training costs relative to industry  +  0  0 
Workforce characteristics: 
Average tenure in the firm  -  -  + 
Average tenure in the industry  -  0  0 
Heterogeneity of the workforce  +  +  0 
Other HRM practices: 
National recruitment  0  +  0 





















  24Logit Results for the Adoption of Job Rotation 
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  25Quality circles 
 
 
Team bonus schemes 
 
 
Individual bonus schemes 
 
 







Local labor market 
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The numbers in parenthesis are the standard errors and the numbers in curly brackets are the marginal effects 
(evaluated at the mean for continuous variables, and for a discrete change for the discrete variables). The 10, 5 and 1 



















  26Table 8 
Some Robustness Checks 
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